US - Israel Relationship

Primer - Short

1. History

American support for Zionism is centuries old, dating back to the Pilgrims and other colonial settlers
Early political and community leaders expressed support for the reestablishment of a Jewish homeland, often based on biblical and restorationist principles
The Blackstone Memorial, a restorationist petition written in 1891, featured the signatures of several high-ranking industrial and political leaders including JP Morgan and JD Rockefeller
Woodrow Wilson and Congress both endorsed the Balfour Declaration, Great Britain’s expression of support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine
Despite opposition from close advisers, Harry Truman recognized the new State of Israel minutes after independence was declared
Since Israel’s establishment, public and Congressional support has remained consistently strong
The US-Israel relationship is built on two primary components – strategic cooperation and shared values

2. Strategic Cooperation

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley, assessed in 1952 that only Britain, Turkey, and Israel could help the U.S. with their air forces in the event of a Soviet attack in the Middle East
Israel has demonstrated its willingness and ability to defend Western interests; at two different points Israel helped protect and preserve the Hashemite region in Jordan
Israel shared significant intelligence on Soviet weapons and tactics from battlefield experience
Israel destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, hindering Saddam’s WMD capabilities years before American forces fought in Iraq
The US and Israel cooperate on anti-terrorism, anti-ballistic missile and anti-proliferation activities
Israel has the ability to support, maintain and even upgrade American made equipment
Haifa has an excellent deep-water port that has served as a base for the US Sixth Fleet

3. Shared Values

The US and Israel are democracies that share a Judeo-Christian heritage
LBJ once remarked, “Our Republic, like yours, was nurtured by the philosophy of the ancient Hebrew teachers who taught mankind the principles of morality, of social justice, and of universal peace. This is our heritage, and it is yours.”
Both countries protect individual freedoms, tolerance and the rule of law; similarities can be found in the Bill of Rights and Israel’s Basic Law on Human Dignity and Liberty
Bill Clinton explained, “…democracy abroad also protects our own concrete economic and security interests here at home.”

Primer - Long

Introduction

Numerous polls conducted by Gallup and other media organizations demonstrate strong and continuing American support for Israel and the US-Israel relationship. This level of support, while encouraging for Israel supporters, is not a recent development. Rather, American support for the State of Israel is a long-standing characteristic of American policy dating to the creation of the state, and is especially pronounced among elected officials and political leaders in American society.

America and Israel before the Creation of the Modern State

American support for reestablishing a Jewish homeland can be traced back to (and even preceding) colonial times. Pilgrims and other early European settlers derived their inspiration from the Old Testament and the story of the ancient Israelites. These Protestant refugees and settlers believed themselves to be embarking on a New Zion in the New World. Many believed as well that reviving the Jewish homeland in the land of Israel was part of G-d’s plan for humanity, a sentiment that could be heard in churches and other colonial meeting houses.

This popular belief was expressed by John Adams, who wrote, “I really wish the Jews again in Judea an independent nation for, as I believe, the most enlightened men of it have participated in the amelioration of the philosophy of the age.” Similar sentiments would be expressed by succeeding presidents from John Quincy Adams to Abraham Lincoln. The Biblical sources for the American Protestant experience and the view that America is an instrument of God's plan have been powerful sources of American sympathy for Jews and ultimately Israel.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, pro-Zionist sentiment could also be found among prominent American business and community leaders. The Blackstone Memorial, a 'restorationist' petition published in 1891, featured the signatures of magnates J.P. Morgan and John D. Rockefeller, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and over 400 other notable figures. It called on President Benjamin Harrison to press Russia and European powers to permit 2,000,000 Russian Jews to settle in Palestine. The petition, however, was not a religious appeal but rather addressed the human rights situation of Jews under Russian control.

The Twentieth Century up to 1948

With the growth of political Zionism in the first half of the 20^th century and increasing waves of Jewish immigration to both the United States and to Palestine, the issue of American support became more pressing. Though opposition to the creation of a Jewish state would develop, based on antisemitism and pro-Arab sentiments, as well as a desire not to alienate the Ottoman Empire, Zionism got a significant boost in 1917 when President Woodrow Wilson and the U.S. Congress endorsed the Balfour Declaration, in which the British government endorsed the idea of a Jewish state. Despite this milestone, American involvement in the post-WWI Middle East was relatively limited. Oil exploration in Iran and Saudi Arabia were more important than the resettlement of Jews in Palestine under the auspices of the British Mandate.

But World War II, the Holocaust and the turmoil in Palestine as te British Mandate drew to a close contributed to a vastly larger American role in the Middle East. The horrific results of the Holocaust and the tremendous numbers of Jewish and other refugees in Europe changed policy debates in the United States, which pressured Great Britain to admit at least some refugees into Palestine. At the same time the conflicting nationalist aspirations of Jews and Arab in Palestine had to be set within two rapidly changing contexts. First was the the withdrawal by European powers from their colonies around the world and the rise of many nationalist movements and conflicts, the largest of which was between India and Pakistan. The second was the emerging Cold War between the West and the Soviet Union. This formally divided Europe and the two sides also began competing for power and influence among newly emerging states around the world

These realities led to serious debates within the Truman administration over Middle East policy. On the one hand a pro-Zionist policy had the benefit of being both moral, with respect to refugees, and consistent with American support for new nationalist movements. On the other, alienating new Arab states, some of them oil producers, ran the risk of creating economic turmoil at home and opportunities for Soviet influence abroad. Truman, more inclined to support Zionist aspirations than his predecessor, faced serious opposition to supporting the establishment of a Jewish state from his inner circle of advisers, including George Marshall.

The United States and the State of Israel, from 1948 to 1968

Truman defied many of his closest advisers and offered recognition of the State of Israel on May 15, 1948, minutes after the proclamation of independence had been read. His much-debated decision apparently stemmed from religious convictions, humanitarian concerns, and electoral considerations, although many analysts believe that this decision was in spite of heavy Jewish lobbying, not because of it. American recognition of Israel, however, brought little material support. As war erupted in the Middle East in 1948, an arms embargo was placed on the region. And with the escalating Cold War, the Truman administration was more focused on confronting the Russian threat during the 1948-1949 blockade of Berlin and keeping oil from the Middle East flowing freely.

After Truman, President Dwight Eisenhower’s foreign policy centered on containing the Soviet Union and limiting the influence of Moscow around the globe, including the Middle East. Eisenhower saw Israel as an obstacle to building a pro-American coalition in the region and on multiple occasions pressured Israel to soften its stance regarding the Arab states. In 1956, Eisenhower demanded that Israel (along with Britain and France) withdraw from Egyptian territory following the Sinai campaign, launched by the three powers after Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal. In the end, however, American efforts at wooing Arab states failed and Russian influence in the region gradually expanded. Though overall American-Israeli relations were relatively cool thanks to Eisenhower’s regional goals, Israel began to demonstrate its strategic importance to the West. In 1958, for example, Israel agreed to overflights of its territory, allowing British planes to reach the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan, then under threat of a coup.

By the beginning of the 1960s Israel was slowly beginning to assert itself as a regional power capable of defending Western interests as well as its own. Shifts in White House attitudes toward Israel became more apparent under President John Kennedy, primarily as a result of new Cold War realities. Stung by the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the deterioration of the security situation in South Vietnam, the Kennedy administration sought unsuccessfully to limit Soviet influence in the Middle East and to bring about a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This pattern – in effect trying to compensate for problems elsewhere by striving for peace in the Middle East - would repeat itself in successive administrations.

Attempts to limit the flow of Soviet arms to Nasser also failed, leaving Israel vulnerable to enhanced Arab armies. As a result of this new reality, JFK agreed to sell the Israelis HAWK anti-aircraft missiles, the first significant American weapons sale to Israel. This sale paved the way for increased cooperation, and more importantly, future arms sales that would offer Israel additional security. In a 1962 meeting with then foreign minister Golda Meir, Kennedy stated, “The United States has a special relationship with Israel in the Middle East really comparable only to what it has with Britain over a wide range of world affairs.” Nevertheless, until 1968 the primary supplier of arms to Israel was not the United States but France.

Perhaps no American president did more to fundamentally alter the US-Israel relationship than Lyndon Johnson. LBJ’s views of Israel were not just defined by international politics, but also by the Judeo-Christian heritage and shared values which he held in high esteem. Johnson was also the first president to host an Israeli prime minister when he invited Levi Eshkol to his Texas ranch. As significant, the Six-Day War in 1967 and its aftermath changed the geo-political landscape of the Middle East, facilitated closer cooperation and a stronger relationship between the two states.

Israel demonstrated with its stunning victory that it could be a reliable strategic asset in the Middle East, not a liability to American objectives. The military defeat of Arab armies outfitted primarily by the Soviets demonstrated the superiority of American and French technology and Israel shared substantial intelligence on captured Soviet equipment, as well as on the military doctrine. The continued intransigence of the Arab and Soviet sides regarding negotiations with Israel and the refusal to consider limits on arms shipments to the region helped convince the White House to sell Israel F-4 Phantom jets in 1968. From this point forward the United States would become Israel’s chief arms supplier and gave formal guarantees regarding its qualitative edge in the region.

From 1968

The mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and Israel continued to develop under President Richard Nixon. In 1970 Israel mobilized its troops at the behest of the United States to help save King Hussein’s regime from a Syrian invasion. This demonstrated both Israel’s willingness and ability to defend Western interests, at a time when the American military was still heavily committed in Vietnam. The American commitment to Israel's survival was also demonstrated in the 1973 Yom Kippur War when Israeli supplies were heavily depleted in the first few days of combat. Refusing to allow Israel to be defeated by Soviet-supported countries and risking direct confrontation with Soviet forces in the Middle East, which had been placed on high alert, Nixon ordered a massive airlift to resupply Israeli forces. These supplies allowed the Israeli military to repulse the Egyptian and Syrian forces and ultimately to defeat them decisively. Nixon's Secretary of State subsequently negotiated agreements that allowed surrounded Egyptian forces to withdraw, and Israeli forces to return to the lines prior to the outbreak of fighting.

The military defeat of 1973, made possible with American support, was decisive for changing the balance of power in the Middle East. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat could, perversely, declare victory, since Israel had been initially taken by surprise. But this was an important psychological move that allowed Sadat to begin repositioning for a major strategic change, from Soviet to American patronage.

Camp David to the Present

With Henry Kissinger remaining as Secretary of State, the Gerald Ford Administration continued with the overall Nixon strategy for the region – building stronger relationships with Egypt and moderate Arab states, a ensuring Israel's security, and encouraging a peaceful settlement to the conflict. However, no major progress would be made on the last front until Jimmy Carter’s presidency. Since 1967 (if not 1948) the US and Israel had demonstrated a desire for achieving a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. And since 1967 Arab states refused to make any conciliatory moves toward Israel in the absence of major territorial compromises, namely return to the 1967 and full return of Palestinians to areas within Israel. But after 1973 Anwar Sadat, Nasser’s successor, decided to act unilaterally. Having achieved a surprise attack on Israel that vindicated Egyptian honor, and sensing that the Soviet Union was entering a period of decline, with American sponsorship Sadat negotiated directly with the Israeli leadership, culminating in the 1979 Camp David peace treaty. Egypt achieved a full return of the Sinai Peninsula and entered into a profitable strategic alliance with the United States.

The significance of this treaty goes beyond the obvious cessation of hostilities between the countries and official recognition of Israel by an Arab state. It also ushered in a new era of substantial American aid to both Israel and Egypt, amounting to billions of dollars annually. After an initial spell of enthusiasm, however, economic and cultural relations between Egypt and Israel have been essential frozen for some twenty years.

Beginning in 1980 Ronald Reagan’s presidency marked another significant point in the US-Israel relationship. Reagan was not just interested in containing the Soviet Union, but wanted to defeat it and bring an end to the Cold War. To do so Reagan build a coalition of states willing to confront the Soviet Union and initiated a large-scale military build-up that the Soviets were compelled to match. As part of that plan, Reagan signed the Memorandum of Understanding with Israel in 1981, cementing the strategic partnership that had been evolving since 1968. This move provided for increased cooperation on a variety of fronts, primarily in the areas of defense and economic development. Though tension spiked between Washington and Jerusalem over the 1982 Lebanon War, the American decision to sell AWACs to Saudi Arabia, and the affair of Jonathan Pollard, an American intelligence officer caught spying for Israel, the strong bonds that had been established withstood the occasional disagreements.

The subsequent George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations featured continued cooperation on multiple fronts, including peacemaking, but also displayed how personal relationships between American and Israeli leaders could alter the tone of the relationship. For example, Israel acceded to American requests not to retaliate to Iraqi missile attacks in the first Gulf War. But personality conflicts between President George H.W. Bush and former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir caused tension at the executive levels and seemed to frustrate both leaders. A stronger friendship and mutual admiration between President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin contributed to a warmer relationship at the top levels of both governments. And despite the frustration exhibited by different presidents, Congressional support for Israel has been consistently strong among both Republicans and Democrats.

A centerpiece of the Clinton Administration were the 1993 Oslo Agreements, which saw the creation of the Palestinian Authority under the leadership of Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yassir Arafat and his circle. Given substantial control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip, negotiations were on-going regarding the formal establishment of a Palestinian state and a peace treaty with Israel. Nevertheless, the massive effort invested by the Clinton Administration and Bill Clinton personally in brokering peace accomplished little, thanks to the refusal of Yassir Arafat to accept Israeli's security needs and territorial proposals. The outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000 and the beginning of a multiyear terror campaign against Israelis marked the end of substantive American-brokered negotiations.

Under the George W. Bush Administration, the United States has strongly supported Israel, and the 9/11 attacks against the United States demonstrated that Islamic terrorists regard the two as equal targets. Israel has been unfairly blamed for the Iraq War, which its officials opposed, and a small cross-section of American writers have bitterly criticized what they regard as Israeli and Jewish domination of American foreign policy. Despite this American-Israel cooperation remains strong on many levels and the continuing reality of fundamentalist Muslim hostility toward Israel, the U.S., and the West in general, is likely to continue and help bolster this cooperation.

The Fundamentals of the American-Israel Relationship

Though the Cold War has ended, the strategic partnership that evolved over the past decades remains. This mutually beneficial relationship is based on tangible and intangible assets as well as the common bonds of democracy and the Judeo-Christian heritage. The American public is relatively familiar with the funding and support the United States has provided Israel. Less understood is what Israel has and can continue to provide. A few points are worth highlighting:

Israel has been willing and able to defend pro-Western interests and regimes in the region, allowing British overflights in 1958 and mobilizing its troops to thwart a Syrian attack on Jordan in 1970
Israel provided valuable intelligence on Soviet weapons, including and tanks and aircraft
Israel destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, hindering Saddam Hussein’s plans to becoming a nuclear power
Israel continues to cooperate with the United States on combating global terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the growing Iranian threat
Israel's high tech economy is deeply integrated and provides key innovations vital for Western technological and scientific development

The Future

With solid support from the public and elected officials, the strategic relationship and overall friendship between the US and Israel is likely to remain strong. Both sides are committed to peace negotiations with Arab states, strengthening moderate Arab and Muslim leaders in the region and preventing a nuclear Iran. This foundation, combined with the values that both societies share, offers a strong base for the continuation of the special partnership in the decades to come.

General Overview

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Videos

“Is Israel Safe for Jews” Jeffrey Goldberg with Michael Oren